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Introduction 
 
 There is by now a broad consensus that global warming threatens significant harm to the 
welfare of people across the world and that national governments should take steps to curb 
warming and alleviate the harm caused by climate change.2  After dragging its heels, the United 
States has joined most other countries in recognizing that action against climate change is 
needed.  Nonetheless,  the United States has not ratified any international climate change treaty.  
Congress has considered, but not passed, greenhouse gas regulation.3  And the EPA has not yet 
proposed broad carbon dioxide regulation,4 despite having been authorized to do so by the 
Supreme Court.5  To all appearances, the federal government is at a point of stasis—deliberating, 
but not acting, on the issue of climate change. 
  
 Yet this appearance is misleading: in fact, the American regulatory state has lurched into 
gear.  Over the past two years, several federal agencies, most notably the Departments of Energy 
and Transportation, have issued fourteen regulations that take into account the effect of industrial 
activities and products on the global climate.  The regulatory activity so far involves relatively 
small-scale projects, for example, energy standards for appliances like air conditioners and gas 
ranges.  But these early efforts by agencies to engage in climate regulation reveal the numerous 
challenges they face, and how they are likely to meet them when they turn to larger scale 
regulation involving power plants, motor vehicle regulation, and manufacturing.  The regulatory 
activity so far has already set precedents on which future regulation will rest, yet despite the 
potentially momentous consequences, it has received no comment in the law review literature. 
 
                                                 
1 University of Chicago Law School.  Thanks to William Hubbard, Saul Levmore, Mike Schill, Naomi Schoenbaum, 
David Weisbach, and an audience at the University of Chicago Law School for helpful comments, and to Paras 
Bhayani and James Kraehenbuehl for research assistance. 
2 See, e.g., William Nordhaus, A Question of Balance: Weight the Options on Global Warming Policies (2008);  
Nicholas Stern, The Economics Of Climate Change (2007); Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, 
Reconstructing Climate Policy: Beyond Kyoto (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and 
China? The Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1675 
(2008); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 905 (2008).  We agree 
with this consensus.  See Eric A. Posner & David Weisbach, Climate Change Justice (2010); Daniel Abebe & 
Jonathan S. Masur, International Agreements, Internal Heterogeneity, and Climate Change: The “Two Chinas” 
Problem, 50 Va. J. Int’l L. 325 (2010). 
3 See Perry Bacon, Jr., Lack of Votes for Senate Democrats’ Energy Bill May Mean the End, Wash. Post., July 23, 
2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/22/AR2010072203614.html 
(“Conceding that they can't find enough votes for the legislation, Senate Democrats on Thursday abandoned efforts 
to put together a comprehensive energy bill that would seek to curb greenhouse gas emissions . . . .”). 
44 The EPA has taken the more limited step of requiring that major carbon dioxide emitters obtain permits.  See 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31514 (Envtl. 
Prot. Agency June 3, 2010).  We discuss this regulation below.  See infra note 71and accompanying text. 
5 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
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 The story begins in 2008, when the Ninth Circuit struck down the Department of 
Transportation’s corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standard for light trucks because the 
cost-benefit analysis used by DOT to determine the standard failed to take account of its 
beneficial effects for climate change.6  The petitioners, which included a number of 
environmental groups, had tried to persuade the court that DOT should not have used cost-
benefit analysis, which they believed was impermissible under the statute.  The court rejected 
this argument but agreed with the petitioners that if DOT uses cost-benefit analysis, then it 
cannot arbitrarily include some benefits (reduction in automobile noise and congestion, for 
example) while excluding the benefits for the climate.7  On remand, DOT set to work monetizing 
the climate benefits.  Other agencies followed its path. 
 
 So it was cost-benefit analysis that initiated climate regulation at the federal level.  
Environmentalists have frequently argued that cost-benefit analysis is a political tool that 
government agencies use to avoid regulation.8  They have harshly criticized Executive Order 
12,296, a Clinton-era executive order that requires regulatory agencies to issue cost-benefit 
analyses for major regulations.9  Yet this order supplied DOT with the authority to engage in 
cost-benefit analysis for the CAFE standards, which in turn led to judicial repudiation because 
DOT’s cost-benefit analysis ignored climatic effects.  In this instance, liberal defenders of cost-
benefit analysis, who have argued that it promotes regulation where regulation is warranted, have 
been vindicated.10 
 
 Or have they?  A close reading of the cost-benefit analyses performed by agencies in 
connection with climate regulation reveals much to worry about.  There is a wide gap between 
the theory of cost-benefit analysis and the performance of the agencies. 
 
 In theory, the relevant monetary valuations for cost-benefit analysis of climate regulation 
would come from climate science and from economics.  The science establishes the approximate 
effects of carbon emissions on the climate.  The economics converts these effects into monetary 
valuations based on their impact on people’s consumption patterns.  Thus, one can establish that 
an additional metric ton of carbon emissions will cause long-term disruptions to climate patterns 
that will interfere with agriculture, raise sea levels, and so forth, which will either directly injure 
people (for example, through an increase in the price of food) or require expensive remedial 
measures (such as the construction of sea walls).  Agencies should use this figure—known as the 
social cost of carbon (“SCC”)—in cost-benefit analysis of regulations. 
 
                                                 
6 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1198-1204 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
7 Id. at 1201. 
8 See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of 
Nothing (2004); Amy Sinden, Douglas A. Kysar & David M. Driesen, Cost-Benefit Analysis: New Foundations on 
Shifting Sand, 3 Reg. & Governance 48, 50 (2009). 
9 The Clinton order renews an earlier order issued by President Reagan, which may explain the association between 
cost-benefit analysis and conservative, anti-regulatory sentiment.  See Matthew Adler & Eric A. Posner, New 
Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis 1-5 (2006). 
10 See Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality: How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better 
Protect the Environment and Our Health (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason: Safety, Law, and the 
Environment (2002). 
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 However, the science does not produce fine-grained predictions with a high level of 
confidence.  It is possible to predict that the median global temperature will rise but not that 
temperatures or rainfall will be disrupted in a crucial agricultural region.  Yet the latter 
information is necessary for an adequate cost-benefit analysis.  The economics poses even 
greater difficulties.  The three major models on which agencies rely are extraordinarily crude.  
The cost of climate change will be high, but it is not clear how high, and one cannot conduct 
cost-benefit analysis of a regulation without knowing what its economic effect will be. 
 
 The regulatory agencies recognize these problems and so far have performed curious 
evasive maneuvers.  They calculate a range of costs rather than a point estimate; then they 
observe that their calculations depend on assumptions that are little more than guesses; and then 
they announce that the specification of a precise figure is irrelevant because the regulation passes 
a cost-benefit test given any of the possible social costs of carbon.  (Agencies often refer to this 
as a “sensitivity test”—they are testing whether the regulation is sensitive to the price placed on 
alleviating carbon emissions.)  For example, in a 2008 regulation of air conditioners and heat 
pumps, the Department of Energy estimated that the social cost of carbon fell somewhere 
between $0 and $20 per ton, and then declined to use any SCC figure in its cost-benefit analysis 
on the ground that the proposed regulation passed a cost-benefit analysis regardless of the value 
of the SCC.11  In a 2009 regulation of fuel economy standards, the Department of Transportation 
calculated a separate $2 domestic SCC and a $33 global SCC, and then used these figures in a 
sensitivity test but not in the cost-benefit analysis.12  Meanwhile, in 2008 the Environmental 
Protection Agency estimated SCCs of $68 per ton (using a 2 percent discount rate) and $40 per 
ton (using a 3 percent discount rate) in an advance notice of proposed rulemaking under the 
Clean Air Act.13   
 
 In response to this confusion, the Office of Management and Budget convened an 
Interagency Working Group (“IWG”) and gave it the task of resolving the disagreements among 
agencies.  The resulting document contains a highly sophisticated and carefully written survey of 
the academic work, emphasizing that many uncertainties remain in the science and economics.  It 
proposes a range of SCCs reflecting different assumptions about the appropriate discount rate 
and the year in which the regulation is issued.14  For 2010, the SCC is $4.70 at a discount rate of 
5 percent, $21.40 at a discount rate of 3 percent, and $35.10 at a discount rate of 2.5 percent.  
The IWG does not instruct agencies which discount rate to use.  Since the IWG figures were 
issued, agencies have stopped making their own calculations and have instead relied on the IWG 
figures.  But they have generally ignored the SCC when performing the cost-benefit analysis 
used to justify their regulations and instead employed it only in sensitivity tests. 
 
                                                 
11 Commercial Standard Sized Packed Terminal Air Conditioners and Packed Terminal Heat Pumps, 73 Fed. Reg. 
58,772 (Dep’t of Energy October 7, 2008). 
12 Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Model Year 2011, 74 Fed. Reg. 14,196 
(Dep’t of Transp., Nat’l Highway Traffic and Safety Admin. March 30, 2009). 
13 Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 (Envt’l. Prot. Agency 
proposed July 30, 2008). 
14 See Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Small Electric Motors, 75 Fed. Reg. 
10874-01 app. 15A at 40 (Dep’t of Energy Mar. 9, 2010) (Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, 
Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866) [hereinafter IWG Report]. 
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 This Article examines the record of the agencies (Part I) and the reasoning in the IWG 
report (Part II).  We write on a blank slate.  Legal scholars have analyzed the prospects for an 
international agreement on climate change;15 the possible forms of federal climate legislation;16 
the future of EPA regulation under the Clean Air Act;17 and the possibility that greenhouse gases 
might be regulated by states and localities,18 or through litigation.19  But the national regulatory 
efforts already underway have escaped their notice. 
 
 Much of our Article is devoted to cataloging the errors in the analysis of the agencies and 
the IWG report.  But we also develop a larger theme about the relationship between cost-benefit 
analysis and politics.  Although we both support cost-benefit analysis for routine agency action, 
we believe that some of the criticisms of cost-benefit analysis have plausibility in the context of 
climate change.  Climate change poses two problems for cost-benefit analysis.  First, there is 
tremendous uncertainty—not about whether climate change will harm human beings, but about 
which human beings will be harmed, and where, and how much, and what weight those harms 
should have in the cost-benefit calculation.  In the absence of this information, agencies cannot 
conduct proper cost-benefit analyses.  Second, climate change is an international problem, while 
                                                 
15 E.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh & Mark A. Cohen, Climate Change Governance: Boundaries and Leakage, 18 
N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 221 (2010) (describing mechanisms for bringing major polluting nations into compliance with 
international climate accords); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
905 (2008) (analyzing the international nature of global warming and the need for an international solution); 
Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1961 
(2007) (same); Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols,  38 Envtl. L. Rep. News & 
Analysis 10566 (2008) (discussing the need for, and difficulties with, an international climate accord). 
16 E.g., David A. Super, From The Greenhouse to the Poorhouse: Carbon-Emissions Control and the Rules of 
Legislative Joinder, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1093 (2010) (analyzing the leading legislative options for regulating carbon 
emissions); Lisa Schultz Bressman, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 599 (2010) (discussing 
the ramifications of climate change legislation on agency structure and authority); Gilbert E. Metcalf & David 
Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 499 (2009) (describing how a legislatively enacted 
federal carbon tax might be structured); Robert L. Glicksman, Balancing Mandate and Discretion in the Institutional 
Design of Federal Climate Change Policy, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 196 (2008) (analyzing the question of how 
much authority Congress should delegate to the EPA to regulate climate change); Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change 
Legislation in Context, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 245 (2008) (considering various legislative proposals). 
17 E.g., J.D. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative 
State: A Guide For Whittling Away, 98 Cal. L. Rev. 59 (2010) (noting the legal problems involved with agency 
regulation of a massive issue such as climate change); Abigail R. Moncrieff,  Reincarnating the “Major Questions” 
Exception to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (Or Why Massachusetts V. EPA Got It Wrong), 
60 Admin. L. Rev. 593 (2008) (arguing that the Supreme Court should have refused to interfere with the EPA’s 
decision not to consider regulating carbon dioxide); Madeline June Kass, A Nepa Climate Paradox: Taking 
Greenhouse Gases Into Account in Threshold Significance Determinations, 42 Ind. L. Rev. 47 (arguing that federal 
agencies should take climate change into account when drafting NEPA analyses) (2009); Jason Scott Johnston, 
Climate Change Confusion and the Supreme Court: The Misguided Regulation Of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Under The Clean Air Act, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1 (2008) (arguing that the EPA should have been permitted to 
regulate climate change). 
18 E.g., Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands On Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for Bidirectional Climate 
Change Regulation, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 669 (2010) (suggesting the possibility of state or local regulation of greenhouse 
gas production); Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”? Litigation's Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 
Va. J. Int'l L. 585 (2009) (discussing regulation at local, state, federal, and international levels). 
19 E.g., Randall S. Abate, Public Nuisance Suits for the Climate Justice Movement: The Right Thing and the Right 
Time, 85 Wash. L. Rev. 197 (2010) (proposing the use of private law as a means of forcing reductions in carbon 
emissions); Kirsten H. Engel, Harmonizing Regulatory and Litigation Approaches To Climate Change Mitigation: 
Incorporating Tradable Emissions Offsets Into Common Law Remedies, 55 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1563 (2007) (same). 
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American regulatory practice, including its use of cost-benefit analysis, is oriented to activities 
with domestic effect.  International relations pose inescapable political questions, which cost-
benefit analysis cannot resolve. 
 
These shortcomings demonstrate the limits of cost-benefit analysis as a policy tool.  The 
best case for cost-benefit analysis is that its recommendations are politically neutral in the sense 
of drawing on widely shared intuitions about human well-being.20  Cost-benefit analysis cannot 
cope with inherently political questions involving contested normative issues.  In some cases, the 
source of conflict is so clear that no one seriously argues that regulatory agencies should solve 
them using cost-benefit analysis.  Consider abortion, affirmative action, and religious 
accommodation.  In other cases, the source of conflict is more subtle.  We will argue that climate 
change is one such case.  In Part III, we make this argument and suggest ways forward. 
 
 
I.  Carbon Pricing in Existing Regulations 
  
 In the past two years, fourteen federal regulations have addressed the benefits of reduced 
carbon dioxide emissions.21  Some of these regulations predate the IWG report and draw upon 
other calculations of the social cost of carbon; others obtain their carbon prices directly from the 
IWG report.  Agencies that depend on pricing carbon run squarely into the problem that there is 
no single price: the IWG, for instance, offers four different prices.  The agencies attempt to skirt 
the problem by claiming that their regulatory choices do not depend upon the precise cost of 
carbon selected.  They endeavor to prove that they would necessarily have opted for the identical 
regulation under any of the possible carbon prices. 
 
 In the sections that follow, we survey three representative regulations, two promulgated 
before the IWG report and one that employs the IWG’s carbon prices.  These sections have two 
purposes.  First, we provide a detailed picture of how federal agencies have already taken up the 
task of regulating carbon.  Second, we demonstrate that for all of these regulations, the choice of 
a carbon price is in fact significant.  Agencies cannot simply pretend that their regulatory 
decisions are invariant to the SCC; they must actually select a cost of carbon if they are to 
regulate intelligently. 
 
A.  Model Year 2011 CAFE Standards 
 
 One of the earliest federal regulations to incorporate a social cost of carbon was the 
Department of Transportation’s (“DOT”) new set of Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
(“CAFE”) standards for Model Year 2011, issued on March 30, 2009.22  CAFE standards are 
minimum requirements for the average fuel economy of a carmaker’s entire fleet, adjusted by the 
number of each automobile sold.  Thus, if Toyota sells 1000 pickup trucks, each of which 
averages 20 miles/gallon, and 3000 compact cars, each of which averages 30 miles/gallon, 
                                                 
20 For a defense of this claim, see Adler & Posner, supra note 9. 
21 We cite them, infra. 
22 Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Model Year 2011, 74 Fed. Reg. at 14,196. 
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Toyota’s corporate average fuel economy is approximately 27 miles/gallon.23  If DOT issues a 
CAFE standard higher than 27, then Toyota must adjust by withdrawing some of the pickup 
trucks from the market, increasing its sales of compact cars, or improving the fuel efficiency of 
the cars and/or trucks. 
 
According to the DOT, the majority of the benefits from stricter CAFE standards stem 
from savings in the production and distribution of gasoline: if drivers use less fuel, less money 
need be spent on producing and distributing that fuel.24  Nonetheless, one of the most obvious 
additional benefits of requiring that automakers produce fuel-efficient automobiles is the 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.  After the Ninth Circuit overturned DOT’s CAFE 
standards for model years 2008-2011 for failing to monetize the benefit of reduced carbon 
emissions, DOT went back to the drawing board.25  DOT solicited public comments and then 
settled on a range of three prices for the SCC derived from a 2008 paper by Richard Tol, who, as 
we will see, is one of the economists whose work the IWG incorporates.26  Tol’s 2008 paper is a 
survey of over two hundred separate estimates of the social cost of carbon published in peer-
reviewed journals through 2006.27  DOT selected as its middle value the mean price from Tol’s 
survey: $33 per ton of carbon dioxide.28  DOT’s “high” estimate is one standard deviation above 
the mean from Tol’s study: $80 per ton of CO2.29 
 
Like the IWG report, these prices include all global benefits, foreign and domestic.  For 
its “low” estimate, DOT selected its best estimate of the purely domestic benefits of reducing 
carbon emissions.30  It calculated this price by adjusting Tol’s $33 estimate downward based on 
the “U.S. share of world economic output (which ranges from 20-28 percent) and published 
estimates of the relative sensitivity of the U.S. economy to climate changes.”31  DOT calculated 
that the United States would suffer between 0 and 14 percent of the global costs of climate 
change, chose the midpoint of that range (7 percent), and calculated the domestic cost of carbon 
as 7% of $33, or approximately $2.  That left DOT with three values—$2, $33, and $80—that 
are roughly similar to the carbon prices subsequently calculated by the IWG.32 
 
                                                 
23 Corporate average fuel economy is calculated using the harmonic mean of the fuel economies of the fleet vehicles, 
rather than the arithmetic mean (which would yield a corporate average fuel economy of 27.5 miles/gallon using the 
hypothesized numbers).  See Corporate Average Fuel Economy - Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporate_Average_Fuel_Economy#Calculuation (last visited July 8, 2010).  
24 74 Fed. Reg. at 14,412 (Table IX-3).  According to the DOT, these savings comprise approximately three quarters 
of the total benefit of fuel economy regulation. 
25 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008). 
26 Richard S.J. Tol, The Social Cost of Carbon: Trends, Outliers, and Catastrophes, Economics—the Open-Access, 
Open-Assessment E-Journal, 1, 2 (2008). 
27 Id. 
28 Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Model Year 2011, 74 Fed. Reg. at 14,346. 
29 Id.  It is worth noting that one standard deviation from the mean is approximately the 85th percentile of the 
distribution.  Accordingly, this $80 per ton price represents only an 85th percentile estimate, not an upper bound. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 14,349; see also Mark A. Delucchi, Summary of the Non-Monetary Externalities of Motor Vehicle Use, 
UCD-ITS-RR-96-3 (9) rev. 1, Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California, Davis, originally 
published September 1998, revised October 2004, pp. 49-51. Available at http:// 
www.its.ucdavis.edu/publications/2004/UCD-ITS-RR-96-03(09)_rev1.pdf (last accessed March 23, 2009). 
32 See infra Part II. 
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These initial carbon prices were denoted in 2007 dollars.  DOT decided to increase the 
prices by 2.4% in each subsequent year “because the increased pace and degree of climate 
change—and thus the resulting economic damages—caused by additional emissions are both 
expected to rise in proportion to the existing concentration of CO2 in the earth’s atmosphere.” 33  
Crucially, however, these 2.4% increases were not pegged to constant dollars.  In other words, if 
the value of one ton of carbon dioxide were $1.00 in 2007 (in 2007 dollars), it would be $1.024 
in 2008 (in 2008 dollars).  In order to determine the value of that 2008 ton of carbon dioxide in 
constant (2007) dollars, it would be necessary to discount the $1.024 price back to 2007 dollars.   
DOT elected to apply a 3% discount rate to the social costs of carbon.34  This meant that in 
constant dollars the social costs of carbon would decrease over time.  This approach contrasts 
with the IWG report, which has carbon prices that increase steadily over time (in constant 
dollars), a point to which we return below.35 
 
The DOT then ran a set of models meant to estimate the costs and benefits of different 
CAFE standards and selected what it believed to be the “optimized” rule—the one that would 
generate the greatest net benefits.  The agency tested this “optimized” rule to determine whether 
it was sensitive to the choice of carbon price, and concluded that “the optimized CAFE standards 
for MY 2011 cars and light trucks were unaffected by the choice among those values for 
reducing CO2 emissions from fuel production and use.”36  DOT reported the results of its cost-
benefit analysis for this optimized rule, along with rules 25% below (i.e., lower mandatory fuel 
efficiency) and 25% and 50% above (i.e., higher mandatory fuel efficiency) the optimal.  DOT 
also reported cost-benefit numbers for two other potential standards: 1) the standard that would 
generate costs approximately equal to benefits; and 2) the standard at the point of “technical 
exhaustion”—the greatest fuel efficiency possible given current technology.  The results of 
DOT’s cost-benefit analysis are reproduced in Table 1 below: 
 
Table 1: Benefits and Costs of Possible CAFE Standards (versus Baseline of No Action) Over Lifetime of Model 
Year 2011 Automobiles (millions of 2007 dollars)37 
 25% Below 
Optimized 
Optimized 25% Above 
Optimized 
50% Above 
Optimized 
Total Costs 
= Total 
Benefits38 
Technology 
Exhaust 
Total 
Benefits 1,707 1,948 2,321 2,763 3,676 9,356 
Total 
Costs 940 1,145 1,918 2,545 4,009 18,120 
Net 
Benefits 767 802 403 218 -334 -8,765 
 
As part of this cost-benefit analysis, DOT estimated that its optimized regulation would 
eliminate 8.33 million tons of CO2 emissions over the lifetime of the model year 2011 
                                                 
33 Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Model Year 2011, 74 Fed. Reg. at 14,350. 
34 Id. at 14,355. 
35 For instance, the IWG’s median carbon prices (discounted at 3%) grow at an approximate yearly rate of 2.1%, in 
constant dollars, between 2010 and 2020.  IWG Report at 40. 
36 Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Model Year 2011, 74 Fed. Reg. at 14,351. 
37 Id. at 14,385 (Tables VII-4 through VII-6). 
38 As is obvious from the numbers, costs are not quite equivalent to benefits under this regulatory option. 
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automobiles.39  It priced these emissions at $2/ton, for a total benefit of approximately $16 
million.  It is immediately apparent that if the social cost of carbon were much higher—$80 per 
ton, or even $64.9 per ton, the 95th percentile value from the SCC—the benefits from reduced 
CO2 emissions would exceed the gap between the Optimized and 25% Above Optimized or 50% 
Above Optimized standards.  Of course, in order to determine whether one of those options 
would in fact produce greater net benefits than the Optimized standard, it is necessary to know 
what reduction in emissions each of these alternatives would produce.  To the best of our 
knowledge, DOT did not report these figures for the lifetime of model year 2011 automobiles.  
However, it did report expected reductions in CO2 emissions from 2010 to 2100, assuming that 
its regulatory standards remained in force during that time.  If we assume that emissions 
reductions from 2010 to 2100 are proportional to emissions reductions for model year 2011 
automobiles, we can calculate expected reductions for model year 2011 vehicles under each 
regulatory scenario.  Those results and calculations are listed in Table 2 below:  
 
Table 2: CO2 Emissions by Passenger Cars and Light Trucks with Alternative CAFE Standards for Model Year 
2011 (million tons CO2)40 
Alternative Cumulative Emissions, 2010-2100 
Emissions Reductions from 
2010-2100 Compared to No 
Action Alternative 
Emissions Reductions 
Over the Lifetime of 
Model Year 2011 
Automobiles 
No Action 210,279 0 0 
25% Below Optimized 209,076 1,203 7.44* 
Optimized 208,932 1,347 8.33 
25% Above Optimized 208,743 1,536 9.50* 
50% Above Optimized 208,440 1,839 11.37* 
Total Costs = Total Benefits 208,015 2,265 14.01* 
Technology Exhaustion 204,228 6,052 37.43* 
 
Consider the results of this analysis if the social cost of carbon is priced at the IWG’s 3% 
discount value ($21.40 per ton in 2010).  Let us suppose that the lifetime emissions for model 
year 2011 automobiles are evenly distributed across the years 2010 through 2021.  If that is the 
case, the costs and benefits are as follows:41 
                                                 
39 Id. at 14,412. 
40 Id. at 14,390 (Table VII-11).  Values labeled with “*” were calculated, not reported from the DOT regulation. 
41 DOT also claimed that reducing American oil consumption would produce “monopsony benefits”—lower oil 
prices for consumers due to the fact that a reduction in American monopsony consumption of oil would decrease 
world oil prices.  See id. at 14,329.  However, DOT decided to significantly reduce its estimation of these 
monopsony benefits when pricing CO2 emissions at $33 and $80 per ton.  See id. at 14,416 n. 473.  DOT did not 
explain its reason for doing so, and we cannot make sense of this decision. 
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Table 3: Benefits and Costs of Possible CAFE Standards (versus Baseline of No Action) Over Lifetime of Model 
Year 2011 Automobiles (millions of 2007 dollars) at IWG 3% Discount Carbon Prices 
 25% Below 
Optimized 
Optimized 25% Above 
Optimized 
50% Above 
Optimized 
Total Costs 
= Total 
Benefits 
Technology 
Exhaust 
Total 
Benefits 1,868 2,128 2,526 3,008 3,978 1,0164 
Total Costs 940 1,145 1,918 2,545 4,009 18,120 
Net 
Benefits 948 983 606 463 -31 -8,044 
 
The higher price on carbon does not alter the benefits so radically as to make regulations 
25% Above or Below Optimized preferable.  But the gap in net benefits between these regulatory 
choices has narrowed.  Moreover, the “Optimized” CAFE standard is meant to be the regulation 
that provides the greatest net benefits.  With a different price on carbon, that optimal point may 
well shift upward—perhaps not all the way to 25% Above the current point, but at least 
somewhat above DOT’s chosen standard. 
 
In addition, these costs and benefits reflect model year 2011 cars only.  If the regulations 
remained in place and costs and benefits were computed for the next 10, 20, or 50 years, they 
would generate even greater reductions in carbon emissions.  If those reductions were valued in 
accordance with the IWG report, the “optimal” CAFE standards would be more stringent (that is, 
require greater fuel efficiency) than DOT’s calculations reveal.  This is due in large part to the 
fact that under the IWG report the discounted social costs of carbon increase over time, while 
DOT proceeded on the assumption that the discounted social costs will diminish with time.42  
Thus, if DOT’s claim that its choice of CAFE standard was invariant to the price of carbon is 
correct, it is likely correct only under a particular set of parameters specified by DOT itself.  As 
the price of carbon and the regulatory time frame increase, stricter CAFE standards appear more 
attractive. 
 
B.  Energy Conservation Standards for Fluorescent and Incandescent Lamps 
 
On July 14, 2009, the Department of Energy (“DOE”) promulgated a regulation setting 
energy efficiency standards for General Service Fluorescent Lamps (“GSFL”) and Incandescent 
Reflector Lamps (“IRL”).43  More efficient fluorescent and incandescent lamps reduce electricity 
consumption, and thus simultaneously eliminate greenhouse gas emissions.44  In fact, according 
to DOE’s analysis, the reduction in carbon emissions is one of the primary sources of benefits 
from mandating more efficient lamps.45  However, because this regulation was completed before 
                                                 
42 IWG Report at 40.  In addition, the lower the discount rate, the faster the rate of increase in the price of carbon.  
Thus, the lower the SCC discount rate, the greater the gap over time between benefits calculated according to the 
IWG report and benefits calculated by DOT. 
43 Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards and Test Procedures for General Service 
Fluorescent Lamps and Incandescent Reflector Lamps, 74 Fed. Reg. 34,080 (Dep’t of Energy July 14, 2009). 
44 The principal cost of such regulation is the greater expense required to produce more efficient lamps, a cost that 
will most likely be passed along to consumers.  See id. at 34,084 (predicting higher consumer prices). 
45 Reducing consumption of electricity also produces other environmental benefits, such as reducing emissions of 
sulfur dioxide, mercury, and nitrous oxide.  Id.  We focus here on carbon dioxide, as it is responsible for the lion’s 
share of the benefits and is most subject to uncertainty in pricing. 
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the publication of the IWG report, DOE was also forced to rely upon other sources when pricing 
the benefits of lower emissions.  It chose to employ the Department of Transportation’s prices 
from its CAFE standards: $2, $33, and $80 per ton.46  DOE also decided to increase these values 
by 3% per year “to represent the expected increases, over time, of the benefits associated with 
reducing CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions.”47  As with the CAFE standards, however, 
these 3% increases were not pegged to constant dollars.  DOE applied two discount rates to the 
benefits and costs of its regulation: 3% and 7%.  Thus, at 3%, the social costs of carbon are 
constant (in constant dollars) over time; at 7% they decrease fairly rapidly.  This is again in 
contrast to the IWG, which concluded that the social cost of carbon will increase steadily over 
time. 
 
For each of these two types of lamps, DOE considered five different potential levels of 
energy efficiency, numbered in order of increasing stringency.  That is, the higher the number, 
the greater the energy efficiency that would be required.  DOE calculated the benefits of reduced 
carbon emissions for the two lamps at each of these five potential levels of efficiency, and at the 
3% and 7% discount rates.  DOE’s estimates of reduced CO2 emissions are presented as ranges, 
due to DOE’s inability to predict whether more efficient lamps will obviate coal-fired or natural 
gas-fired plants.48  In the interests of simplicity we focus here only on IRL, though the analysis is 
the same for both types of lamps.  DOE’s results are displayed below: 
 
 
Table 4: Estimates of Value of CO2 Emissions Reductions for IRL by Level of Regulation at Seven-
Percent and Three-Percent Discount Rates49 
Regulation 
Level 
  
Estimated 
cumulative CO2 
emission 
reductions from 
2012 to 2042 
(MMt)  
  
Value of estimated CO2 emission 
reductions (billion 2008$) at 7% 
discount rate 
Value of estimated CO2 emission 
reductions (billion 2008$) at 3% 
discount rate 
  
CO2 value 
of $2/ton 
CO2 value 
of $33/ton 
CO2 value 
of $80/ton
CO2 value 
of $2/ton 
CO2 value 
of $33/ton 
  
CO2 value 
of $80/ton 
1 7 to 20 0.0 to 0.0 0.1 to 0.3 0.3 to 0.8 0.0 to 0.0 0.3 to 0.7 0.6 to 1.7 
2 19 to 49 0.0 to 0.1 0.4 to 0.8 0.8 to 2.1 0.0 to 0.1 0.7 to 1.7 1.6 to 4.1 
3 38 to 85 0.0 to 0.1 0.7 to 1.5 1.7 to 3.6 0.1 to 0.2 1.3 to 2.9 3.2 to 7.1 
4 44 to 106 0.0 to 0.1 0.8 to 1.8 1.9 to 4.4 0.1 to 0.2 1.5 to 3.7 3.7 to 8.9 
5 53 to 118 0.1 to 0.1 1.0 to 2.0 2.3 to 4.9 0.1 to 0.2 1.8 to 4.1 4.5 to 9.9 
 
 DOE then calculated the annual benefits (net of costs) at each level of regulation.  It 
offered “primary,” “low,” and “high” estimates of these benefits.  The “primary” estimate is 
DOE’s best guess, given an intermediate price of carbon (approximately $33/ton) and median 
estimates of the reduction in emissions.  The “low” and “high” estimates are based on lower and 
higher estimates of both price and emissions.  DOE reported net benefits at discount rates of 3% 
                                                 
46 See supra Part II.A.1. 
47 Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards and Test Procedures for General Service 
Fluorescent Lamps and Incandescent Reflector Lamps, 74 Fed. Reg. at 34,163. 
48 Coal-fired plants produce greater CO2 emissions per unit of electricity. 
49 74 Fed. Reg. 34,080, 34,164 (Table VII.28). 
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and 7%.  The results are displayed below, with the level of regulation that would provide the 
highest net benefit (for each emissions estimate and discount rate) in bold: 
 
Table 5: Annualized Benefits Net of Costs for IRL by Level of Regulation (in $millions/year, for the period 2012-
2042)50 
Regulation 
Level  
Primary estimate at 
discount rate:  
Low estimate at discount 
rate: 
High estimate at discount 
rate:  
 7% 3% 7% 3% 7% 3% 
1 18 29 -9 -2 44 61 
2 326 352 203 215 449 489 
3 459 532 297 339 620 725 
4 532 590 179 207 885 973 
5 621 687 247 280 994 1093 
 
 These tables make clear that the optimal level of regulation depends upon the price of 
carbon and estimated emissions reductions.  Consider Table 5, which reports the net benefits of 
IRL regulation.  At low estimates of emissions and price, Level 3 regulation provides the greatest 
net benefits.  Indeed, the advantages over Levels 4 and 5 are quite pronounced.  But at primary 
or high estimates, Level 5 regulation is optimal and provides substantially greater net benefits 
than Levels 3 or 4.  In addition, it is hard to know where the crossover point lies.  There are 
obviously carbon prices and emissions estimates above the “low” estimates at which Level 3 is 
optimal; and there are also prices and emissions estimates below the “primary” estimates at 
which Level 5 is superior.  Indeed, there may be some combination of price and emissions 
between the low and primary estimates at which Level 4 regulation provides the greatest net 
benefits. 
 
 In the end, DOE opted to regulate IRL (and GSFL) at Level 4, despite the cost-benefit 
advantages of requiring greater energy efficiency.51  The agency concluded that Level 5 
regulation was “economically [un]justified,” contrary to the results of its own cost-benefit 
analysis, because it would place excessive burdens on producers and some consumers who 
would be forced to pay higher prices for more efficient lamps.52  In some sense, then, the choice 
of a price for carbon was irrelevant to the final regulatory decision.  But if the agency had 
followed its own cost-benefit analysis, the particular price put on carbon emissions would have 
been important—and perhaps decisive. 
 
C.  Energy Conservation Standards for Small Electric Motors 
  
The first regulation to employ the IWG’s SCC was the Department of Energy’s Energy 
Conservation Standards for Small Electric Motors, promulgated on March 9, 2010.53  The IWG 
                                                 
50 Id. at 34,171 (Table VII.34). 
51 Id. at 34,169-73. 
52 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6295(o)(2)(A)).  We have our doubts about the normative soundness of this conclusion.  
See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657 (2010). 
53 Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Small Electric Motors, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,874 
(Dep’t of Energy March 9, 2010). 
13 
 
reportwas first published as an appendix to this rule,54 and to our knowledge it has not been 
published again since.  As the title would indicate, this regulation mandates energy efficiency 
guidelines for two types of small electric motors: “polyphase” small electric motors and 
“capacitor-start” small electric motors.55  For each of these two types of motors, DOE considered 
eight different potential levels of energy efficiency, numbered in order of increasing stringency.  
(Again, the higher the number, the greater the energy efficiency that would be required.)  The 
regulatory levels for capacitor-start motors are numbered 1 through 8; the levels for polyphase 
motors are numbered 1 through 7, with an additional level “4b” that represents an adjusted set of 
regulations that the agency believed would more closely approach optimal levels.  DOE then 
examined the effect of each potential regulation on carbon dioxide emissions from 2015, when 
the regulation will take effect, until 2045.56  It estimated the likely reductions in CO2 emissions 
that would result from increased efficiency (and thus diminished need for electrical power 
generation), and then priced the benefits of these reduced emissions using the four different 
carbon prices reported by the IWG.  Again, in the interests of simplicity we focus here only on 
polyphase motors, though our analysis of capacitor-start motors is essentially the same.  DOE’s 
results are as follows: 
 
 
Table 6: Estimates of Global Present Value of CO2 Emissions Reductions for the Period 2015-2045 
Under Polyphase Small Electric Motor Trial Standard Levels57 
Regulation 
Level 
Estimated 
cumulative CO2 
emission 
reductions, Mt  
Global value of CO2 emission reductions, million$ 2009 
 
5% discount rate 3% discount rate 2.5% discount rate 3% discount rate, 95th percentile 
1 2.3 8 40 68 122
2 4.6 16 81 138 248
3 8.3 28 146 248 445
4 9.3 32 165 280 502
4b 15.4 52 272 462 828
5 18.3 62 323 550 986
6 19.5 66 344 585 1049
7 21.2 72 375 638 1144
 
 
 As an initial matter, it is a bit difficult to determine whether DOE has in fact priced its 
own carbon reductions correctly.  Take, for instance, the very first row of Table 6 (Level 1 
regulation).  DOE estimated that this level of regulation would reduce CO2 emissions by 2.3 
million tons from 2015 to 2045.  According to the IWG report, the price of one ton of CO2 in 
2015 is $5.70 at a 5% discount rate.58  That price only rises over the next 30 years, reaching 
$14.20 in 2045.  In addition, the IWG prices are in 2007 dollars, while the dollar values reported 
                                                 
54 See id. at 10,911 (referencing “Appendix A of the Annex to Chapter 15 of the Technical Support Document”). 
55 Id. at 10,932.  For our purposes, the differences between these two types of motors are irrelevant.  We mention 
them both only to explain that the agency’s analysis proceeded in two parts. 
56 Id. at 10,931. 
57 Id. at 10,931 (Table VI.31). 
58 IWG Report at 40. 
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in the DOE regulation are in 2009 dollars, which are less valuable.  Thus, the global value of 
CO2 emission reductions at Level 1 should be at minimum $13 million, and actually much 
more.59  Yet the regulation values these CO2 reductions at only $8 million.  This problem exists 
with every one of the calculations, and we cannot explain these discrepancies. 
 
 DOE then calculated the benefits of regulation (net of costs) for the two types of motors, 
at eight possible levels of regulation, across the four standard prices for carbon dioxide from the 
IWG report.  The results are displayed in Table 7 (polyphase motors) .  The level of regulation 
that will provide the highest net benefit at each price of carbon is in bold. 
 
Table 7: Total Net Benefits at Various Social Costs of Carbon for Polyphase Small Electric Motors (2015-2045)60 
Regulation Level 
  
Consumer NPV (in billion$ 2009) at 3% discount rate with: 
  
CO2 value of 
$4.7/metric ton CO2  
CO2 value of 
$21.4/metric ton CO2 
CO2 value of 
$35.1/metric ton CO2  
CO2 value of 
$64.9/metric ton CO2 
1 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.39
2 0.57 0.64 0.69 0.81
3 1.04 1.16 1.27 1.47
4 1.08 1.22 1.34 1.57
4b 1.49 1.73 1.92 2.29
5 0.83 1.11 1.34 1.79
6 0.13 0.42 0.66 1.14
7 (12.57) (12.26) (11.99) (11.47)
 
 As the reader can observe, the level of regulation that provides the greatest net benefits is 
not affected by the choice of carbon price.  For polyphase motors, Level 4b delivers the greatest 
net benefits irrespective of the price of carbon dioxide.  It is on the basis of this finding that DOE 
concluded that the choice of regulatory level was invariant to the choice of carbon price. 
  
Yet it is clear that this conclusion is an artifact of the particular potential levels of 
regulation DOE chose to analyze.  If DOE had not included Level 4b in the analysis, its choice of 
regulation would depend on the price it attached to CO2 emissions.  Per Table 7, if CO2 
emissions are priced at $4.70 or $21.40 per metric ton, Level 4 provides the greatest net benefits.  
If emissions are priced at $35.1 per ton, Levels 4 and 5 provide equivalent benefits.  And if 
emissions are priced at $64.90 per ton, Level 5, a more energy-efficient standard, provides the 
greatest benefits.  DOE evades a decision between Levels 4 and 5 by settling on an intermediate 
option—Level 4b—that is superior to both.  But this raises the implication that there may be 
other intermediate possibilities—imagine Level “4a” or “4c”—that are superior to Level 4b at 
some prices of carbon and inferior at others. 
 
                                                 
59 2.3 million tons of CO2 at $5.70 comes to $13.11 million.  However, the overall figure must be higher because 1) 
the regulation reports values in 2009 dollars while the IWG report lists carbon dioxide prices in 2007 dollars; and 2) 
the social costs of carbon are greater than $5.70 in every year subsequent to 2015. 
60 75 Fed. Reg. 10,874, 10,934 (Table VI.41). 
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 Once again, it is the agency’s decision to consider only particular discrete regulatory 
options, rather than an entire continuum of possibilities, that allows it to conclude that it should 
impose the same regulation regardless of the price of carbon.  The agency chooses its options—
for example, Level 4b, but not Levels “4a” or “4c”—such that one level of regulation is superior 
to all others at each of the four carbon prices.  But that is quite different than saying that the 
optimal level of regulation is unrelated to the price of carbon.  In fact, the agency was most likely 
compelled to investigate Level 4b precisely because the choice between Level 4 and Level 5 
depended entirely on the social cost of carbon.  The Department of Energy, like the Department 
of Transportation, will not be able to avoid choosing a price for carbon dioxide emissions when 
making regulatory decisions. 
 
D.  Further Agency Regulation Involving the SCC 
 
 We have discussed three of the 14 regulations that report an SCC.  Of the remaining 
regulations, seven involved the Department of Energy (air conditioners and heat pumps; 
commercial refrigerators and freezers; residential gas ranges and ovens; commercial heating, air 
conditioning, and water-heating equipment; refrigerated bottled or canned beverage vending 
machines; residential water heaters, direct heating equipment, and pool heaters; and commercial 
clothes washers61).  Two of the remaining regulations involved the Department of Transportation 
(applications for funding under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, and for funding 
for national infrastructure).62  One involved EPA (fuels and fuel additives).63  And one involved 
both DOT and EPA (vehicle emissions).64 
 
 All of the regulatory impact statements accompanying these regulations resemble the 
three we have discussed.  They typically report a range of SCCs, with the statements for the most 
                                                 
61 Energy Conservation Program for Commercial and Industrial Equipment: Packaged Terminal Air Conditioner 
and Packaged Terminal Heat Pump Energy Conservation Standards, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,772-01 (Dep’t of Energy Oct. 
7, 2008); Energy Conservation Standards for Commercial Ice-Cream Freezers; Self-Contained Commercial 
Refrigerators, Commercial Freezers, and Commercial Refrigerator-Freezers Without Doors, 74 Fed. Reg. 1,092 
(Dep’t of Energy Jan. 9, 2009); Energy Conservation Standards for Certain Consumer Products and for Certain 
Commercial and Industrial Equipment, 74 Fed. Reg 16,040 (Dep’t of Energy Apr. 8, 2009); Energy Conservation 
Standards and Test Procedures for Commercial Heating, Air-Conditioning, and Water-Heating Equipment, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 36,312-01 (Dep’t of Energy July 22, 2009); Energy Conservation Standards for Refrigerated Bottled or Canned 
Beverage Vending Machines, 74 Fed. Reg. 44,914-01 (Dep’t of Energy Aug. 31, 2009); Energy Conservation 
Standards for Residential Water Heaters, Direct Heating Equipment, and Pool Heaters, 75 Fed. Reg. 20,112-01 
(Apr. 16, 2010); Energy Conservation Standards for Certain Consumer Products and for Certain Commercial and 
Industrial Equipment, 75 Fed. Reg. 1122-01 (Jan. 8, 2010). 
62 Notice of Funding Availability for Supplemental Discretionary Grants for Capital Investments in Surface 
Transportation Infrastructure Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 28,755-01 (Dep’t 
of Transp. June 17, 2009); Notice of Funding Availability for the Department of Transportation's National 
Infrastructure Investments Under the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act for 2010, 75 Fed. Reg. 30,460-02 (Dep’t of Transp. June 1, 2010). 
63 Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Changes to Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 14,670-01 
(Envtl. Prot. Agency Mar. 26, 2010). 
64 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 
Fed. Reg. 25,324 (Envtl. Prot. Agency and Dep’t of Transp. May 7, 2010). 
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recent regulations using the IWG’s figures.  And they all exclude the SCCs from the actual cost-
benefit analysis, instead merely reporting them or using them in a sensitivity analysis.65 
 
 Meanwhile, the EPA has begun deliberating about climate regulation under the Clean Air 
Act.  In Massachusetts v. EPA,66 the Supreme Court held that if anthropogenic carbon dioxide is 
leading to global warming and causing harm to humans, it is an “air pollutant” under the Clean 
Air Act and the EPA must regulate it.67   On December 7, 2009, the EPA announced its 
conclusion that greenhouse gases threaten public health.68  This finding authorizes the EPA to 
regulate carbon dioxide emissions in a variety of ways, including requiring that CO2 emitters to 
install the “best available” technology to mitigate emissions.  Such regulation would impose 
significant costs on the American economy, but it might also produce substantial benefits by 
mitigating the negative effects of global warming.  Its effects would overshadow the comparably 
trivial regulations that we have discussed so far. 
 
The EPA is at a very early stage in the process of regulating carbon dioxide under the 
Clean Air Act—it has not published proposed regulatory text or officially solicited comments 
from interested private parties.69   In fact, the Obama administration has indicated that the EPA’s 
finding is principally intended to compel Congress to pass greenhouse gas legislation.70  The 
EPA has taken the more limited step of requiring that major CO2 emitters—those that produce 
more than 100,000 tons of carbon dioxide per year—obtain permits and install the best available 
technology before initiating new sources of pollution.71  However, in the cost-benefit analysis 
that accompanied that regulation the EPA refused to quantify the benefits of reduced carbon 
emissions, deeming them too uncertain.72  It did not so much as mention the SCC.  If Congress 
does not act and the EPA eventually promulgates much broader carbon dioxide regulation, it will 
be essential that the agency conduct a full cost-benefit analysis in order to ascertain whether such 
regulation is justified.  An essential component of that cost-benefit analysis, perhaps the 
preeminent part, will be a calculation of the benefits of reduced carbon emissions. 
 
                                                 
65 In some cases, the regulations ask for applications for funds, and ask applicants to use an SCC in determining the 
environmental effects of their proposed project. 
66 Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
67 Id. at 533. 
68 News Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA: Greenhouse Gases Threaten Public Health and the Environment / 
Science overwhelmingly shows greenhouse gas concentrations at unprecedented levels due to human activity (Dec. 
7, 2009), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/7ebdf4d0b217978b852573590040443a/ 
08d11a451131bca585257685005bf252!OpenDocument. 
69 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (describing the rulemaking process that the EPA must undertake before regulating). 
70 See Sindya N. Bhanoo, The E.P.A. Announces a New Rule on Polluters, N.Y. Times, May 14, 2010, at A13, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/science/earth/14permit.html. 
71 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31514 (Envtl. 
Prot. Agency June 3, 2010).  We describe this regulation as more limited both because it regulates only a small 
subset of carbon emitters and because the impact of requiring that even a large emitter install the “best available” 
technology will likely be “relatively small.”  Id. at 31600.  This is “due to the lack of available capture and control 
technologies” for carbon dioxide.  Id. 
72 Id. at 31598-31601. 
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II.  Problems 
 
 In this Part, we turn our attention to the Interagency Working Group’s report on the 
Social Cost of Carbon, the definitive federal administrative statement on the subject.  We 
demonstrate that it suffers from a variety of problems of various types, problems that render its 
conclusions unconvincing.  At a fundamental level, the IWG’s error was in failing to recognize 
the political nature of certain issues, treating them instead as technical matters; and in failing to 
recognize the technical nature of other issues, seeking political solutions where none were 
available. 
 
A. The IWG Report 
 
We begin with a discussion of the IWG’s method for pricing carbon.  The IWG’s 
estimate of the social costs of carbon is based on predictions derived from three separate 
computer models of climate change and economic harm.  These models, all developed by 
academics and widely used in estimating future climate harms, are known as DICE (“Dynamic 
Integrated Climate and Economy”),73 PAGE (“Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse Effect”),74 and 
FUND (“Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation, and Distribution”).75  The three 
models differ in some significant respects (several of which we describe below), but for the most 
part they operate in a similar fashion.  The user enters a set of economic parameters, including 
pre-existing baseline projections of economic growth and technological improvements, 
developed within the standard economic literature.76  These projections include predictions of 
future greenhouse gas emissions, which are a function of GDP and a society’s “carbon 
intensity”: the amount of carbon a nation’s economy must generate in order to produce wealth.77 
 
 From these projected emissions, the climate models predict changes in the concentration 
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.78  Those changes in greenhouse gas concentrations are, in 
turn, used to predict changes in temperature, and the models then project economic harms (in the 
form of diminished worldwide GDP) from the expected temperature increases.79  These models 
thus involve both climate science—translations of greenhouse gas concentrations into 
temperature changes—and environmental economics—predictions of the effect of warming on 
                                                 
73 DICE was developed by William Nordhaus, an economist at Yale University.  William Nordhaus, A Question of 
Balance: Weighing the Options on Global Warming Policies (2008); William Nordhaus and John Boyer, Warming 
the World: Economic Models of Global Warming (2000). 
74 PAGE was developed by Chris Hope, of the Cambridge University Judge Business School.  Chris Hope, Optimal 
Carbon Emissions and the Social Cost of Carbon Under Uncertainty, 8 The Integrated Assessment Journal 107 
(2008); Chris Hope, The Marginal Impact of CO2 From PAGE2002: An Integrated assessment Model Incorporating 
the IPCC’s Five Reasons for Concern, 6 The Integrated Assessment Journal 19 (2006). 
75 FUND was developed by Richard Tol, a professor at the Economic and Social Research Institute in Dublin.  
Richard Tol, Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change.  Part I: Benchmark Estimates, 21 Environmental 
and Resource Economics 47 (2002); Richard Tol, Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change.  Part II: 
Dynamic Estimates, 21 Environmental and Resource Economics 135 (2002). 
76 The IWG report  employed five sets of parameters derived from the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum exercise.  
See IWG Report at 16.  
77 Abebe & Masur, supra note.  Not surprisingly, carbon intensity is primarily a function of a society’s level of 
technology: higher-technology societies are able to produce greater wealth with lower pollution.  Id. 
78 IWG Report at 6. 
79 Id. 
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GDP.  In order to generate values for the social costs of carbon, the Interagency Group ran the 
three models using standard baseline projections of economic growth and technological 
development (the parameters described above) and determined the models’ predicted effects of 
warming on GDP.  The models are all probabilistic, and thus they each generate a probability 
distribution of possible outcomes.  The Interagency Group obtained the mean outcome for each 
model, and then averaged these three means.  The Group then re-ran the same models using the 
same baseline projections, but with one additional ton of carbon emissions, in order to determine 
the marginal effect on global GDP of that additional unit of carbon.  The average reduction in 
GDP across all three models from this second run, minus the average reduction in GDP from the 
first (baseline) run, is the social cost of carbon: the amount of money saved for every marginal 
ton of atmospheric carbon that is not emitted. 
 
 Rather than declare a single value for the social cost of carbon, the IWG reports different 
values for every year from 2010 to 2050.  The yearly values differ both because the cost of 
carbon must be discounted to present value, and because one additional unit of carbon will likely 
affect the environment differently in 2020 than it does 2010.  This is due to the fact that the 
relationship between atmospheric concentrations and carbon is not linear, and there will likely be 
more carbon in the atmosphere in 2020 than in 2010.  Accordingly, an additional ton of carbon 
will likely cause greater warming in 2020 than it would in 2010 because it will combine with an 
already carbon-saturated atmosphere. 
 
The IWG does not specify a discount rate.80   Instead, the IWG reports average social 
costs of carbon at discount rates of 5%, 3%, and 2.5%.  The IWG also reports the 95th percentile 
probabilistic value for the social cost of carbon (at a 3% discount rate), as a means of providing 
something of an upper bound on the likely costs.  The IWG predicts that the additional harm 
from carbon emissions in later years will outpace the rate of monetary discounting, even at a 
discount rate of 7%, and thus the social costs of carbon increase with time in constant dollars, 
rather than decreasing.  Table 8 reproduces the Interagency Group’s chart of social costs of 
carbon at various discount rates from 2010 through 2021. 
 
                                                 
80 IWG Report at 17-23. 
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Table 8: Annual SCC Values: 2010–2050 (in 2007 dollars per ton)  
Discount rate: 5% 3% 2.5% 95th 
Year 
2010  4.7 21.4  35.1  64.9  
2011  4.9 21.9  35.7  66.5  
2012  5.1 22.4  36.4  68.1  
2013  5.3 22.8  37.0  69.6  
2014  5.5 23.3  37.7  71.2  
2015  5.7 23.8  38.4  72.8  
2016  5.9 24.3  39.0  74.4  
2017  6.1 24.8  39.7  76.0  
2018  6.3 25.3  40.4  77.5  
2019  6.5 25.8  41.0  79.1  
2020  6.8 26.3  41.7  80.7  
2021  7.1 27.0  42.5  82.6  
 
 The use of these carbon prices in federal regulations is meant to be straightforward.  
Suppose a regulation will reduce carbon emissions by 10,000 tons per year in every year from 
2010 through 2020.  An agency would simply multiply the emissions avoided by the price of a 
ton of emissions in the appropriate year to calculate the full carbon-related benefit from the 
regulation.  The agency would need to choose which discount rate to use—and the IWG provides 
no guidance on this issue.  In this example, the regulation would generate a carbon-related 
benefit of $2.62 million, assuming a discount rate of 3%. 
 
B. Technical Problems Internal to the IWG’s SCC Calculation 
 
 There is, to say the least, a great deal of uncertainty surrounding both climate science and 
environmental economics.  The IWG is admirably modest and forthright about these limitations, 
and  the last few pages of the document list a number of analytical shortcomings.81  To begin 
with, the models do not account for all potential non-catastrophic harms because of data 
limitations.  For instance, the models do not attempt to quantify the effects of ocean acidification 
or the economic and political consequences of population migration that result from warming.82  
Nor do they account fully for the possibility of catastrophic harm.  For instance, the FUND 
model does not account for the possibility of catastrophic harms of any sort, obviously biasing its 
estimates of harm downward.  The other models may be underestimating the probability of 
catastrophic events by significant margins as well.83  In addition, each of the models assumes 
                                                 
81 IWG Report at 5 (“The interagency group offers the new SCC values with all due humility about the uncertainties 
embedded in them.”) 
82 Id. at 30. 
83 Id. at 30-33.  There are a number of possible climate change-related “tipping points”: points at which some drastic 
climatic event occurs with potentially extreme economic or sociological consequences.  These include, for instance, 
the collapse of the Greenland Ice Sheet or the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, each of which would raise sea levels 
substantially.  Climate scientists estimate the likelihood of one of these events occurring at nearly 50%, assuming 
2.5 degree global warming.  Id. at 33.  These “tipping points” would not necessarily generate economic catastrophes 
(as they are defined by the climate models), but it is worth noting that the probability of such an event occurring is 
nearly an order of magnitude higher than the probability of an economic catastrophe under the DICE or PAGE 
models.  (PAGE puts the likelihood of a catastrophe at nearly zero, while DICE estimates it at 4%, again assuming 
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that humans will adapt at relatively low cost to many of the results of climate change, though 
these assumptions are never justified.84  Indeed, the rate and cost of adaptation is one of the 
foremost issues that confounds attempts to estimate the costs of warming.  Finally, each of the 
models assumes risk neutrality.85  However, people are risk averse, and insurance markets may 
not be able to handle the increased risk caused by climate change.86  Rather than calculate a rate 
of risk aversion and open itself up to criticism for its choice, the IWG made the more politic (but 
less useful) choice to elide the issue entirely. 
 
 The IWG is to be commended for acknowledging the weaknesses of its own analysis.  
But by the same token, the IWG’s recommendations are not adequately defended.  Many of its 
errors are likely errors of underestimation: it is likely that the IWG does not incorporate all the 
potential harms of global warming, and thus underestimates the benefits of curbing emissions.  
But others go the other direction.  We describe these additional errors and shortcomings below. 
 
 
 The models use weakly defended assumptions.  The models require the input of a set of 
economic starting points: estimates of how economic growth and technological development 
would proceed absent any global warming.  The models are obviously sensitive to these initial 
parameters: high economic growth will lead to greater carbon emissions, and thus greater 
warming and climate-related harms.  In order to accommodate this uncertainty and sensitivity, 
the Interagency Group used five different sets of initial parameters, ran each model with each set 
of parameters, and then took the average result across all three models under all five sets of 
starting points.87  Four of these initial sets of parameters were “business as usual” scenarios—
best estimates of the current state of the economy and its likely growth over the coming 
decades.88  One of them was a more optimistic set of parameters—it was actually named 
“MERGE Optimistic”—that assumed that technological developments would limit atmospheric 
carbon concentrations at relatively low levels for decades into the future.89 
 
 The IWG was right to average across a variety of initial economic parameters as a means 
of addressing the uncertainty surrounding future economic growth and the sensitivity of climate 
models to economic projections.  But what could be the justification for choosing four standard 
sets of assumptions and one optimistic scenario?  Why did the Group not employ one pessimistic 
scenario, to balance its use of the optimistic scenario?  It is entirely possible that global growth 
will drive carbon emissions to levels beyond what standard assumptions would predict.  For 
instance, if the Chinese economy continues to expand at a high rate and this expansion is fueled 
                                                                                                                                                             
2.5 degree warming.) See also Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic 
Climate Change, 91 Rev. Econ. & Statistics 1 (2009); Martin L. Weitzman, A Review on the Economics of Climate 
Change, 45 J. Econ. Lit. 703 (2007). 
84 IWG Report at 31. 
85 Id. 
86 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), IPPC Fourth Assessment Report Climate Change 2007: 
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability 380-81 (2007). 
87 These five sets of economic parameters were borrowed from the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum exercise.  Id. 
at 16.  This modeling exercise developed ten different sets of economic parameters; the Interagency Group selected 
five of the ten.  Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 16-17. 
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primarily through coal and other “dirty” forms of energy production, global carbon emissions 
could rise significantly faster than economists and scientists currently predict.90 
 
 This raises a larger issue regarding these parameters and the manner in which they are 
employed by the models.91  All of the economic parameters, and all of the models, assume that 
worldwide carbon intensity—carbon emissions per dollar of GDP—will decline steadily.  They 
assume that the worldwide economy will become “cleaner” over time, producing fewer and 
fewer carbon emissions per dollar of GDP.  This is a reasonable assumption for developed 
economies that have already industrialized and are in the process of developing cleaner 
technologies.  But industrializing economies exhibit precisely the opposite behavior: carbon 
intensity increases as the economy begins to rely more and more heavily on coal and other 
carbon-intensive sources of energy, and only decreases later once a certain level of technology 
and prosperity has been achieved.  For instance, Chinese carbon intensity rose through the late 
1970s, and carbon intensity is still rising in parts of western China that are still industrializing.92  
As other nations in Asia, Africa, and South America continue to industrialize in the coming 
decades, carbon intensity in those regions may well rise, rather than fall.  This will not likely 
offset the overall decline in carbon intensity throughout the world, led by technological advances 
in the United States, Europe, and China.  But it could render assumptions regarding consistent 
declines in carbon intensity unrealistic and thereby indicate that the IWG underestimates future 
harms due to climate change. 
 
 In another important respect the IWG’s analysis may be overly optimistic.  None of the 
three models incorporates emissions of any greenhouse gas other than carbon dioxide.93  A 
regulation that led to lower carbon emissions might simultaneously offset those reductions by 
inducing higher emissions of some other greenhouse gas such as methane (an even more potent 
greenhouse gas).  If firms have the capacity to switch production from some activity that 
generates carbon dioxide to another activity that generates methane, the SCC will overestimate 
benefits from reductions in carbon emissions.94 
 
 The models are crude and inconsistent.  At the low levels of emission reductions relevant 
here, the DICE, FUND, and PAGE models produce highly divergent results.  Recall that the 
models are probabilistic; they each produce a range of possible outcomes of varying 
probabilities.  FUND is the most optimistic: its median estimate of damage from global warming 
is lower than all but 5% of the estimates from the PAGE model.95  For its part, the median PAGE 
estimate is lower than all but 5% of the estimates from the DICE model.  In other words, FUND 
                                                 
90 Abebe & Masur, supra note. 
91 For discussion, see Daniel A. Farber, Modeling Climate Change and its Impacts: Law, Policy, and Science, 86 
Tex. L. Rev. 1655 (2008); see also Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 76 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1355, 1386-97 (2009) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis cannot handle climate change because of scientific 
uncertainty). 
92 Abebe & Masur, supra note. 
93 IWG Report at 13. 
94 This inter-gas leakage is an echo of the even more serious problem of international emissions leakage that we 
discuss below. 
95 IWG Report at 10.  Recall that damages under these models are probabilistic, and thus they produce probability 
distributions of possible damages. 
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estimates are at the extreme low end of PAGE estimates, and PAGE estimates are at the extreme 
low end of DICE estimates.  
 
 What accounts for these inconsistencies?  It is hard to be certain because only the DICE 
model is fully transparent.  The authors of the other models have not released all of their 
equations and calculations to the public (which indeed is an additional reason why it might not 
be proper for the government to rely on them).  But we can use the DICE model to illustrate a 
problem that, we suspect, exists in the other models as well. 
 
 The central equation in the DICE model is: 
 
Q(t) = Ω(t)[1-Λ(t)]*A(t)K(t)γL(t)1-γ, 
 
where Q(t) is aggregate global economic output.96  The equation after the “*” is just the standard 
neoclassical production function, where A(t) is factor productivity, K(t) is capital stock, and L(t) 
is labor inputs.  In the neoclassical production function, economic output is a function of capital 
investment and labor.  Long-run growth is determined by technological innovation and 
population changes, which are exogenously assumed.  Although neoclassical economic growth 
models have received criticism, they are consistent with much empirical evidence, and are 
widely used. 
 
 DICE’s innovation is to multiply the neoclassical production function by a damage 
function, Ω(t)[1-Λ(t)], where Ω(t) maps global mean temperature changes to a damage variable, 
and Λ(t) maps abatement expenditures to an abatement variable.  As temperature increases, the 
damage percentage and abatement costs increase, lowering aggregate economic growth.  
Because capital spent on abatement expenses is diverted from capital devoted to economic 
growth, aggregate output is maximized when the marginal cost of abatement expenditures equals 
the marginal cost of climate-related economic harm.  The SCC can be backed out of this model: 
it is the price of carbon at which the optimal investment in abatement will be made. 
 
 As we noted, the economic growth model is relatively uncontroversial, but where does 
the damage function come from?  Nordhaus and Boyer explain: 
 
The aggregate damage curve is built up from estimates of the damages of the 12 regions, 
including assumed sectoral change and underlying income elasticities of different 
outputs. It includes estimated damages to major sectors such as agriculture, the cost of 
sea-level rise, adverse impacts on health, and nonmarket damages, as well as estimates of 
the potential costs of catastrophic damages.  It is clear that this equation is extremely 
conjectural, given the thin base of empirical studies on which it rests.97 
 
“Extremely conjectural” is right.  The damage function is essentially a guess.  And if, as we 
suspect, the models differ in large part because their authors chose arbitrarily different damage 
                                                 
96 Nordhaus & Boyer, supra at 41. 
97 Nordhaus & Boyer, supra at 41-42. 
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functions, then the SCC just reflects the average of three arbitrary guesses.98  If this is the case, it 
is hard to have much confidence in the SCC calculated by the IWG.99 
 
 In addition, the manner in which results are reported, coupled with the wide spread 
among the three models, conveys an excessively optimistic sense of the potential magnitude of 
the climate risk.  Recall that the IWG reports the 95th percentile carbon costs (at a 3% discount 
rate) as a means of establishing an upper bound on the likely benefits of emissions reductions.100  
This 95th percentile figure is an average of the 95th percentile values of all three models.  But the 
models generate very different 95th percentile predictions—for instance, FUND’s 95th percentile 
value is only a small fraction of PAGE’s.  Moreover, FUND does not include any potential 
catastrophic outcomes.  In this sense, the 95th percentile figure is not a realistic bound on the 
potential harm from climate change; it is a high estimate mitigated by the much more optimistic 
figures produced by FUND.  Regulators (and the public) should not be misled into thinking that 
there is little chance that carbon costs will exceed the 95th percentile figure reported by the IWG. 
 
To be sure, there is nothing wrong with using a variety of models that make different 
predictions.  Under conditions of uncertainty, this may be the only wise course of action.  But the 
extreme discrepancies between these three models—FUND and DICE are essentially 
inconsistent with one another—does not inspire confidence.  It seems likely that one of the three 
models is simply incorrect and is skewing the overall results improperly.101  It was perhaps an 
overabundance of caution (both scientific and political) that led the Interagency Group to employ 
all three models, rather than attempting to select the most reliable one or two among them.  If the 
IWG had excluded one or more of these models, it might have opened itself up to criticism for 
having cherry-picked available science in order to buttress preferred conclusions.  Yet the 
inclusion of an inaccurate model is no better than the exclusion of an accurate one.102  In this 
respect it appears that the IWG selected what amounts to a political solution to a technical 
problem, choosing to eschew difficult technical decisions regarding which models to employ.  
This approach ill serves the regulatory agencies who must rely upon the IWG report.  
 
The IWG assumes that the benefits of curbing carbon emissions are linear with the 
number of tons of carbon emitted, at least for small reductions in emissions.  That is, the IWG 
assumes that the benefit of reducing carbon emissions by 20 tons in 2010 is exactly twice the 
benefit of reducing emissions by 10 tons in the same year: $420 versus $210 (at a 3% discount 
rate).103  This may be a reasonable assumption for very small reductions in national emissions, 
                                                 
98 The models use different economic growth models, but these are unlikely to be the source of much difference, 
because all economic growth models attempt to explain the same thing—observed economic growth in different 
countries. 
99 For a general and somewhat more optimistic discussion of climate modeling, see Daniel A. Farber, Modeling 
Climate Change and its Impacts: Law, Policy, and Science, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1655 (2008). 
100 IWG Report at 26. 
101 For instance, we find it remarkable that the majority of climate-related damages in North America anticipated by 
FUND are in the form of increased demand for air-conditioning.  Id. at 8.  We are not experts, but this hardly seems 
an accurate portrayal of the harm likely to befall farmers and workers in North America in the event of significant 
climate change. 
102 See Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 606, 653 
(2008) (“Unfortunately, the premises for Condorcetian confidence are lacking. . . . For the Theorem to hold . . . the 
mean accuracy of all voters must be better than random--for instance, greater than 50% for binary choices . . . .”). 
103 IWG Report at 3. 
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but only for very small reductions.  The relationship between the amount of carbon emitted into 
the atmosphere and the warming it causes is likely quadratic, cubic, or even exponential, rather 
than linear.  Similarly, the relationship between global temperature changes and economic harm 
is likely nonlinear.  Indeed, the DICE and PAGE models assume that the relationship between 
temperature change and economic harm obeys a power law: DICE assumes that economic 
damages increase as the square of the change in global temperature, while PAGE uses a variety 
of values ranging from a linear relationship to an assumption that damages increase as the cube 
of temperature changes.104  It is for this reason that the IWG report is unsuitable for measuring 
the benefits of major greenhouse gas regulation such as the EPA might undertake in response to 
Massachusetts v. EPA.  The report itself is explicit on this point.105  If EPA is to calculate the 
costs and benefits of across-the-board regulation of carbon dioxide, it must undertake a separate 
analysis and cannot rely upon a number of simplifying assumptions made in the course of this 
report.   
If a regulation causes only a very small reduction in overall carbon emissions, it is 
appropriate to approximate these higher-order effects as linear.  But it is possible that a number 
of independent regulations, in combination, will together reduce emissions by more than a small 
fraction.  The United States produced approximately 1.65 billion tons of CO2 in 2004.106  Over 
the past two years, federal agencies have promulgated a number of regulations that are expected 
to cause significant reductions in carbon dioxide emissions, many of them in the millions of tons 
annually.107  For instance, the Department of Energy’s July 2009 regulation regarding the energy 
efficiency of fluorescent and incandescent lamps is expected to reduce domestic CO2 emissions 
by more than 300 million tons over the next thirty years.108  If enough of these regulations were 
put into force over the same period of time, they could have nonlinear—quadratic, or even 
exponential—effects on global warming.  For instance, significant increases in CAFE 
standards,109 coupled with improvements in energy efficiency standards for household 
appliances110 and related policies, might lead to abatement of emissions that are too great to be 
priced accurately using the IWG’s analysis.111  The effects of these small reductions in 
combination might be nonlinear, and might be more beneficial than the IWG’s simple model 
would indicate.  By considering these reductions in piecemeal fashion, agencies might miss 
significant interaction effects between regulations.  If this is the case, the IWG report would 
understate the benefits from reducing carbon emissions by a significant degree.112 
  
                                                 
104 Id. at 7. 
 
 
106 Abebe & Masur, supra note. 
107 See infra Part II.A., infra.    
108 See Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards and Test Procedures for General Service 
Fluorescent Lamps and Incandescent Reflector Lamps, 74 Fed. Reg. 34,080, 34,164 (Table VII.27) (2009); infra 
Part II.A.2. 
109 E.g., Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 
75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (Envtl. Prot. Agency and Dep’t of Transp. May 7, 2010). 
110 Energy Conservation Standards for Certain Consumer Products and for Certain Commercial and Industrial 
Equipment, 75 Fed. Reg. 1122-01 (Jan. 8, 2010). 
111 See supra Part I.A.1. 
112 On the other hand, the relationship could be less than linear, meaning that the Appendix actually overstates 
benefits of reducing emissions.  However, given the widespread belief among climate modelers that damages scale 
more than linearly with increases in global temperature, this seems unlikely. 
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*  *  * 
 
 The IWG report is an admirable attempt to price the benefits of regulatory reductions in 
carbon dioxide emissions.  Nonetheless, it is rife with uncertainty and error, and internal 
disagreements between the models used to generate the final prices do not inspire confidence.  
Many of these errors are likely errors of underestimation—the social costs of carbon may well be 
higher.  Moreover, a consistent theme emerges from these errors: in many cases, the IWG 
adopted “political” solutions, designed to appease all sides, where more difficult technical 
decisions were called for. 
 
C. International Leakage 
 
 The carbon-absorbing property of the atmosphere is a global public good.  People 
everywhere in the world benefit when the atmosphere absorbs carbon because the harmful 
effects of global warming and other disruptions to the climate are avoided.  When one country 
limits emissions, and other countries do not, the first country provides benefits to the world, 
enjoys only a small share of these benefits, and incurs the full costs of its behavior.  The result is 
that countries acting unilaterally will reduce carbon emissions inadequately.113 
 
 The IWG report recognizes this problem, noting: 
 
Even if the United States were to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to zero, that step 
would be far from enough to avoid substantial climate change.  Other countries would 
also need to take action to reduce emissions if significant changes in the global climate 
are to be avoided.  Emphasizing the need for a global solution to a global problem, the 
United States has been actively involved in seeking international agreements to reduce 
emissions and in encouraging other nations, including emerging major economies, to take 
significant steps to reduce emissions.  When these considerations are taken as a whole, 
the interagency group concluded that a global measure of the benefits from reducing U.S. 
emissions is preferable.114 
 
The difficulty lies in the fact that other countries, with the limited exception of the member states 
of the European Union, have not taken significant steps to reduce emissions.  Thus, the last 
sentence does not follow from the sentences that precede it. 
 
 To understand why, one must understand the problem of leakage.  Leakage occurs when 
carbon-emitting activities in one country migrate to another country where regulation of carbon 
emissions is weaker.  Suppose, for example, that the U.S. government limits carbon emissions of 
automobile manufacturers, raising the cost of production, and hence the price of automobiles, 
reducing the demand for American-made cars.  All else equal, American consumers will, at the 
margin, stop buying American-made cars and instead buy foreign-made cars that are not subject 
                                                 
113 For recent discussions in the law review literature, see Michael P. Vandenbergh & Mark A. Cohen, Climate 
Change Governance: Boundaries and Leakage, 18 NYU Envt’l L.J. 221 (2010); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful 
U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate Change, 32 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 293 (2008); Jonathan B. Wiener, 
Climate Change Policy, and Policy Change in China, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1805 (2008). 
114 IWG Report at 11-12. 
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to the American-imposed carbon cap.  As a result, foreign automobile manufacturers will expand 
production and hence generate greater carbon emissions—potentially offsetting or even 
exceeding the reduction in carbon emissions that took place in the United States.115  Because the 
harm to the climate is independent of the source of the emissions, the American cap will have no 
effect on climate change.  Its only effect will be job loss in the short term, and, in the long term, 
a transfer of carbon-intensive industry from American soil to foreign soil, which may well be 
less economically efficient (as it requires transportation of cars back to the United States, loss of 
comparative advantage efficiencies, and so on).116 
 
 Consider another way in which leakage occurs.  Suppose that American climate 
regulation increases the cost of oil for American industry and consumers, resulting in a decline in 
demand.  Because American demand for oil declines, and oil is bought and sold on a global 
market, the global price of oil will decline.  As the global price of oil declines, people in other 
countries will buy more of it.  Depending on the precise shape of the supply and demand curves, 
the quantity of oil consumed in the new equilibrium may be close to the quantity of oil consumed 
prior to the introduction of American climate regulation.  Foreign-produced oil originally 
intended for the American market will be sent to other countries, outside of American regulatory 
control. 
 
 In this extreme scenario, leakage is one hundred percent, with the result that the 
American regulation produces no social gains and only costs.  However, there are two constraints 
on leakage.  The first might be described as physical or technological.  In our first example, it 
may turn out to be the case that the increase in the price of cars will have a limited effect on 
demand (demand is relatively inelastic).  Perhaps, for example, the cost of transporting cars from 
overseas is very high; or American automobile manufacturers simply produce more desirable 
cars.117  It is also possible that foreign manufacturing processes are less carbon-intensive than 
American manufacturing processes.118  In any of these cases, the reduction in carbon emissions 
from American manufacturers will only be partly offset—say 10 or 30 or 70 percent—by the 
increase in carbon emissions from foreign manufacturers.  The extent of these offsets will vary 
from industry to industry. 
 
 The second constraint is legal.  Suppose the U.S. government enacts a law that bans or 
taxes the importation of all foreign automobiles, or those that were produced using excessively 
                                                 
115 Foreign production of automobiles might increase carbon emissions because energy is “dirtier” in, for instance, 
China than it is in the United States.  Because Chinese electricity producers rely more heavily on coal and have 
installed fewer pollution-controlling technologies than American producers, each unit of energy produced in China 
generates correspondingly greater quantities of carbon emissions.  Abebe & Masur, supra. 
116 For a discussion, see, e.g., Mustafa H. Babiker, Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and Carbon Leakage, 
65 J. Intern’l Econ. 421 (2005). 
117 Neither of these possibilities appears to be true, but they could be in other industrial contexts. 
118 This is likely true with respect to some countries, but not with respect to others.  The United States ranks 92nd 
among the 133 nations (for which there are data) in the carbon intensity of its energy production.  That is to say, 91 
countries produce less carbon per unit of energy than the United States; 41 produce more.  World Resources 
Institute, Climate Analysis Indicators Tool, Carbon Intensity of Energy Use in 2006,  available at 
http://cait.wri.org/cait.php?page=carberg&mode=view.  Notably, China, Australia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, and 
Denmark have less carbon-efficient economies than the United States; Japan, India, Canada, and most European 
countries are more efficient.  Id.  Though energy is not the only input to production, the carbon efficiency of energy 
production is roughly correlated with the carbon efficiency of production more generally. 
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carbon-intensive manufacturing processes.  Such a law would require foreign producers either to 
abandon the American market or to produce less carbon-intensive cars for export to the United 
States.  In either case, the leakage problem would be mitigated.  In reality, laws that address 
leakage by restricting trade would have to overcome a number of hurdles, including international 
trade law, and the difficulty of determining the carbon intensity of particular goods, and it is 
highly unlikely that they could eliminate leakage.119  Because these laws do not yet exist, 
agencies must take into account leakage. 
 
 Scholars have produced a number of estimates of leakage.  At this stage, the estimates are 
highly speculative.  A study by Joshua Elliott and his coauthors considers the problem of leakage 
in a scenario in which all Annex B countries in the Kyoto treaty (major developed nations) adopt 
a carbon tax and the non-Annex B countries do not.120  Using a new computable general 
equilibrium model of the economic effects of climate change, they find that a regional tax would 
reduce emissions only one third as much as an equivalent global tax, and that the effectiveness of 
the regional tax would be reduced a further 15 to 25 percent as a result of leakage.  Constraints 
on emissions in the European Union, the United States, and other Annex B countries would 
increase production and consumption of carbon-intensive goods by 15 to 25 percent in China, 
India, and other non-Annex B countries. 
 
 These figures are suggestive of the problem of leakage if climate regulation were to occur 
in the United States alone rather than in all Annex B countries.  Leakage would now occur not 
only in China and India, but also in the European Union (the largest economy in the world), 
Japan (the second largest national economy), Canada (the tenth largest), and Australia (the 
thirteenth largest).  To be sure, the European Union already has a system of carbon regulation, 
which would limit leakage to some extent, but there is some question how effective that system 
actually is.121  Overall, leakage in a scenario in which the United States alone (or the United 
States and the European Union) engage in carbon regulation, and other countries do not, would 
certainly be higher than 15 to 25 percent. 
 
 To account for this problem, agencies must incorporate leakage estimates into their cost-
benefit analyses involving the SCC.  Consider a regulation that reduces carbon emissions by one 
metric ton.  Using the IWG’s figure for a discount rate of 3 percent, the benefit of the regulation 
would be $21.40.  If we conservatively assume that leakage is 25 percent, this means that the one 
ton reduction of carbon emissions will be offset by a quarter ton rise of carbon emissions in 
another part of the world.  Accordingly, either the agency should discount the expected carbon 
emission by one quarter, or discount the SCC by one quarter.  In either event, the benefit of the 
regulation would be reduced to $16.05. 
 
 Unfortunately, the calculation would not be this simple.  The Elliott et al. study i comes 
to results that conflict with other studies that estimate leakage rates from as little as 3 percent to 
                                                 
119 See Paul-Erik Veel, Carbon Tariffs and the WTO: An Evaluation of Feasible Policies, 12 J. Int’l Econ L. 749, 
755-60 (2009). 
120 Joshua Elliott, Ian Foster, Sam Kortum, Todd Munson, Fernando Pérez Cervantes, & David Weisbach, A 
Quantitative Examination of Trade and Carbon Taxes (unpub. m.s., 2010). 
121  See Frank Convery, Denny Ellerman, and Christian De Perthuis, The European Carbon Market in Action: 
Lessons From the First Trading Period (2008), available at 
http://mit.dspace.org/bitstream/handle/1721.1/44619/MITJPSPGC_Rpt162.pdf?sequence=1.  
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more than 100 percent.122  None of these studies examine the specific case in question where the 
United States but no other country (or only the European Union) adopt significant constrains on 
carbon emissions.  The studies also address different types of leakage—for example, leakage that 
results from regulation of coal versus leakage that results from regulation of petroleum, which 
need not be the same.  Agencies that regulate products like appliances that draw on coal as their 
energy source must use leakage numbers different from those used by agents that regulate 
products like mortor vehicles that draw on petroleum as their energy source.  Petroleum is traded 
on global markets to a much greater degree than coal is, and thus susceptible to greater leakage.  
Similarly, regulations concerning methods of production, such as the production of steel, are 
much more susceptible to leakage than regulations concerning domestic usage, such as 
regulations of the efficiency of automobiles123 or small electric motors.124  Production can be 
transferred overseas to evade regulation, while usage (by Americans) cannot.  Further research 
into leakage rates will be necessary before the SCC can be appropriately discounted. 
 
 In sum, leakage poses two problems.  First, the degree of leakage in current conditions is 
unknown.  Second, and more important, cost-benefit analyses that ignore leakage will 
overestimate the benefits of a regulation.  The amount of leakage will eventually depend on 
international cooperation, and in particular a climate treaty.  How might agencies currently take 
account of this?  It would be wrong for agencies to assume that leakage is zero or very low 
because a climate treaty that eliminates leakage will eventually come into existence.  A climate 
treaty might or might not eventually come into existence.  But if agencies assume that leakage is 
very high, they will rarely engage in climate regulation.  We return to this dilemma in Part III. 
 
D. Valuation of Harms to Foreign Countries 
 
 Climate regulation is distinctive because optimal domestic climate regulation depends on 
the climate regulation of other countries.  This is not true for virtually all other forms of 
regulation.  Consider regulation of arsenic in municipal water supplies.125  The adverse effect of 
arsenic is felt overwhelmingly by Americans; the cost of remedial measures also shows up in the 
water bills paid by Americans living in the cities affected by the regulation.  Aside from a few 
tourists and other foreign visitors, the costs and benefits are felt by Americans. 
 
                                                 
122 Joseph Aldy & William A Pizer, The Competitiveness Impacts of Climate Change Mitigation Policies, The Pew 
Center on Global Climate Change (2009) (noting problem of leakage); Babiker, supra (estimating leakage rates as 
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Mustafa H.M. Babiker & T.F. Rutherford, The Economic Effects of Border Measures in Subglobal Climate 
Agreements, 26 Energy J. 99, 106-08 (2005) (estimating leakage from 7 percent to 39 percent dependant on whether 
the U.S. is included in the Kyoto coalition countries and on what type of protective measures, such as tariffs or 
exemptions, Kyoto coalition countries take to reduce leakage); Ton Manders & Paul Veenendaal, Border Tax 
Adjustments and the EU-ETS: A Quantitative Assessment, CPB Documents 171 (2008) (estimating a 3.3 percent 
leakage rate for reductions made by the European Union). 
123 See Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Model Year 2011, 74 Fed. Reg. at 
14,196 (Dep’t of Transportation March 30, 2009). 
124 Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Small Electric Motors, 75 
Fed. Reg. 10,874 (Dep’t of Energy March 9, 2010). 
 
125 See, e.g., National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 6981 (Jan. 22, 2001) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142).  
29 
 
 By contrast, when American industry reduces carbon emissions, the beneficiaries are 
mainly foreigners.  The population of the United States is less than five percent of the global 
population; and future population growth will occur disproportionately outside the United States.  
Accordingly, reduction of carbon emissions today will benefit far more foreigners, living today 
and in the future, than Americans.  Meanwhile, the costs will be felt mostly although not 
exclusively by Americans.  Most of the costs will be passed on to consumers, who are mostly 
Americans.  Market share will be lost in both domestic and foreign markets because foreign 
manufacturers do not face the same regulations. 
 
 Thus, we can distinguish the global SCC and the domestic SCC.  When U.S. industries 
emit an additional ton of carbon dioxide, the climate-related harm will be partly felt by 
Americans and entirely felt by the global population (including Americans).  For example, if 
global food prices increase as a result of harm to agricultural productivity, the reduction in 
wealth will be felt mostly outside the United States, where 95 percent of the global population is 
located.  Accordingly, the domestic SCC will be less than the global SCC.  A cost-benefit 
analysis that takes into account the well-being only of Americans will use the domestic SCC; a 
cost-benefit analysis that takes into account the well-being of the global population will use the 
global SCC.  A cost-benefit analysis using a global SCC will yield more stringent regulations 
than cost-benefit analysis using a domestic SCC. 
 
 Should agencies such as the EPA use the global SCC or the domestic SCC in its cost-
benefit analysis?  The legal answer is that it depends on the statute.  However, statutes are almost 
always silent about extraterritorial effect.  Consider the statute under which EPA may end up 
regulating climate emissions: 
 
The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) in 
accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any 
air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle 
engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare . . . .126 
 
The term, “air pollutant,” means “any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, 
including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive . . . substance or matter which is emitted 
into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”127 
 
 The question is whether the relevant “public” in the statute includes only Americans or 
the global population.  In most statutes, two considerations would suggest the narrower 
interpretation.  First, courts frequently apply a canon of interpretation that disfavors 
extraterritorial application of laws.128  The presumption is that Congress has no interest in 
regulating overseas—because doing so may offend the sovereignty of other countries, while 
producing few benefits for Americans.  Second, the contrary interpretation implies that EPA 
should regulate, or attempt to regulate, foreign motor vehicle manufacturers, even those who 
                                                 
126 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). 
127 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g). 
128 Recently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 2010 WL 2518523 (U.S. 
2010). 
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produce only for their domestic markets.  Such an interpretation is questionable, to say the 
least.129 
 
 However, the Clean Air Act has a clause that provides for extraterritorial effect with 
respect to countries that reciprocate by regulating their domestic industry so as to benefit the 
United States.130  This suggests that neither the domestic nor global SCC should be used.  The 
SCC should be calculated so as to take into account impacts on countries that enter a climate 
treaty or otherwise engage in climate regulation, and no others.  Notice how far removed this 
approach is from cost-benefit analysis, which does not limit benefits on the basis of the political 
behavior of governments. 
 
 The fourteen regulations that we have been discussing were not issued under statutes with 
reciprocity provisions.  Yet some of them distinguish domestic and global SCCs.  As we noted in 
Part I.A., the Model Year 2011 CAFE rule began with a $33 price for the global SCC.  It then 
separately calculated a domestic SCC on the basis of the U.S. share of world economic output, 
about 20 to 28 percent, and estimates of the sensitivity of the U.S. economy to climate change.  
According to this calculation, the United States would suffer between 0 and 14 percent of the 
global cost of climate change.  DOT took the midpoint, 7 percent, and multiplied it by the $33 
global SCC, yielding a domestic SCC of approximately $2.131 
 
 The calculation is dubious.  The cost of climate change is not a function of the size of a 
country’s economy, but its geography (for example, whether it is low-lying and subject to 
flooding), its mean temperatures (hotter places suffer more from increased heat than colder 
places), the health of the population (healthier people are less susceptible to disease, which 
increases in warmer climates), and so forth.  Scientists have not yet been able to predict regional 
variation in the effects of climate change with any confidence, and for this reason the major 
climate models do not yet make predictions for individual countries—although some economists 
have tried.132   Speculations as to the sensitivity of the American economy are merely that.  It 
follows that even if a global SCC can be calculated, a domestic SCC cannot be estimated to any 
reasonable degree of confidence—although we can be confident that it is less than the global 
SCC. 
 
 Even if American regulatory agencies have the authority to take account of costs to 
foreigners, should they use their discretion to act in that way?  This question can be broken down 
into three inquiries—normative, political, and institutional. 
 
 The normative question is whether Americans have the same moral obligations to 
foreigners who live overseas as they have toward other Americans.  If Americans have weaker 
                                                 
129 For a recent explanation for the presumption of extraterritoriality in litigation involving environmental laws, see 
Jonathan Remy Nash, The Curious Legal Landscape of the Extraterritoriality of U.S. Environmental Laws, 50 Va. J. 
Int’l L. 997 (2010). 
130 42 U.S.C. § 7415(c). 
131 See supra. 
132  See, e.g., Mark A. Delucchi, Summary of the Non-Monetary Externalities of Motor Vehicle Use, UCD-ITS-RR-
96-3 (9) rev. 1, Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California, Davis, originally published September 
1998, revised October 2004, pp. 49-51. Available at http://www.its.ucdavis.edu/publications/2004/UCD-ITS-RR-96-
03(09)_rev1.pdf. 
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moral obligations to foreigners, then American regulatory agencies should discount (partially or 
completely) the negative effects of American activities on foreigners.  Philosophers take 
different positions on this question.  Cosmopolitans believe that moral obligations to help or not 
to harm others do not turn on their nationality; communitarians and nationalists believe that they 
do.133  We do not take a position on this debate; we note only that if Americans owe stronger 
duties to other Americans than to foreigners, then the social cost of carbon should reflect a 
discount for costs incurred by foreigners.  And even if Americans should treat foreigners the 
same as other Americans, there is still a question whether to incorporate foreigners’ own 
valuations, which, in fact, differ from those of Americans, or to use American valuations—that 
is, to value foreigners well-being the same as Americans value their own well-being.134  
Suppose, for example, that Chinese and Italians assign a lower value to morbidity and mortality 
risks than Americans.  Should American regulatory agencies use Chinese and Italian valuations 
or American valuations for climate effects on Chinese and Italians?135   
 
 The political question is whether elected officials and appointees who head regulatory 
agencies should treat costs to foreigners the same as costs to Americans even if they believe it is 
appropriate to do so—or, as a practical matter, whether they can be expected to do so in a 
democracy.  Suppose that most elected officials are cosmopolitans but most Americans are 
nationalists.  For instance, one study suggests that Americans implicitly value a foreign life at 
between one sixth and 1/2000th of an American life.136  Even if we should all be cosmopolitans, 
it is plausible to believe that elected officials have a duty to advance the interests of the 
Americans they represent, as do the regulatory agencies that derive their authority from the 
decisions of elected officials.  In a more practical sense, electoral pressures may dictate that 
governments treat foreigners, who do not have the vote, differently from the way they treat 
citizens. 
 
 The institutional question addresses how regulatory agencies should act, given that they 
have specialized missions.  Even if the cosmopolitan view is correct, and even if politicians 
believe that they should take account of the interests of foreigners, it may well be the case that 
regulatory agencies should not—unless explicitly directed to do so by elected officials. 
 
 There are two reasons for doubting that agencies should treat costs to foreigners and costs 
to Americans as the same.  First, the treatment of foreigners is a diplomatic question, one that is 
addressed by different institutions such as the state department, the White House, and sometimes 
Congress.  To see the problem here, imagine that the optimal approach to climate change is joint 
action by multiple countries, as is surely the case.  The United States and other countries do best 
if all countries reduce greenhouse gas emissions by a reasonable amount.137  However, countries 
disagree about how significant climate change is, and how the costs of responding to climate 
                                                 
133 See generally Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Theory 3-16 (2005) (describing competing 
approaches to international relations including the cosmopolitan, realist, statist, and nationalist approaches). 
134 See W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates 
Throughout the World, 27 J Risk & Uncertainty 5, 26-30 & tble. 4 (2003) (showing a range of valuations for a 
statistical life from $0.8 million in South Korea to $19.9 million in the United Kingdom, in 2000 U.S. dollars). 
135 See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 573 (2005). 
136 Wojciech Kopczuk, Joel Slemrod, and Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Limitations of Decentralized World Redistribution: 
An Optimal Taxation Approach, 49 European Econ. Rev. 1051, 1075 (2005). 
137 See Cass Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 Harv. Envt’l. L. Rev. 1 (2007). 
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change should be allocated among countries.  Countries must resolve these disagreements—in 
effect, choosing a global SCC—before they can cooperate. 
 
It is possible that unilateral action by the United States will induce reciprocal behavior by 
other countries.  But the opposite is more probable: if the United States reduces greenhouse gas 
emissions unilaterally, other countries will fail to reciprocate, preferring to free ride.138  Suppose 
the United States can compel other countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions only by 
threatening not to reduce greenhouse gas emissions itself.  If so, then it would be wrong for 
American regulatory agencies to reduce carbon emissions in a way that reflects the interests of 
foreigners until directed to do so by the political branches. 
 
 In the years leading up to the Montreal Protocol, which restricts the use of 
chlorofluorocarbons and other compounds that cause stratospheric ozone depletion, the United 
States acted first, issuing regulations that greatly reduced use of these compounds by consumers 
and domestic manufacturers.  When it came time to negotiate a treaty with other countries, the 
United States had difficulty persuading them to take similar steps.  These countries may have 
preferred to free ride on American efforts, which conferred benefits on them without imposing 
costs.  The final treaty was less stringent than the United States sought.139  It is possible that this 
disappointment resulted from the self-imposed reduction in bargaining power on the part of the 
United States, although one cannot know for sure. 
 
 Second, the treatment of foreigners is a highly sensitive political question.  As noted 
above, it is not clear whether elected officials should take account of foreign interests to the same 
extent as domestic interests.  And as a practical matter, elected officials must pay attention to the 
views of voters.  Congress is the institutional actor best positioned to decide these normatively 
and politically fraught questions.  If Congress will not act, then the administration should at least 
employ notice-and-comment rulemaking in order to increase the degree of political 
accountability and participation that attends the decision.140  An interagency regulatory group, 
working behind closed doors with no public notice or participation, is not the proper mechanism 
for resolving such issues. 
 
III.  The Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
 Many of the problems in the IWG report are technical.  The SCC chosen by the IWG 
ignores some significant costs, neglects catastrophic risks, and assumes away risk aversion.  
Because the figure assumes a linear relationship between the benefits of carbon reduction and the 
quantity of carbon reduction, it cannot be used for large-scale regulations or even small-scale 
regulations if they aggregate to a large scale.  The SCC reflects arbitrarily chosen damage 
functions (or, more precisely, the average of several arbitrarily chosen damage functions).141  It 
emerges from three climate models of questionable reliability. 
                                                 
138 See Rachel Brewster, Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism and National Climate Change 
Legislation 28 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 245 (2010) (arguing that incremental domestic action may retard the 
development of an international agreement on climate change). 
139 See id. at 9-17 (describing U.S. domestic regulation and international negotiations). 
140 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245 (2001). 
141 This is in addition to the fact that scientific uncertainty makes cost-benefit analysis difficult.  See supra Part II.B. 
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 Guesswork is not always fatal to cost-benefit analysis.  Judgment is needed to distinguish 
between reasonable estimates and estimates that are excessively wide of the mark.  Our judgment 
is that the IWG report relies on too many unwarranted assumptions and cannot be relied on.  But 
technical problems can be repaired through further research.  Computer models of climate 
change are improving and will eventually provide reasonable estimates of the SCC. 
 
 The more serious problem for cost-benefit analysis of climate change is that climate 
regulation requires a series of judgments that are political rather than technocratic.  We review 
those judgments here. 
 
 First, optimal U.S. climate regulation depends on what other countries do.  If other 
countries do not engage in their own climate regulation, then U.S. climate regulation should 
probably be less strict, given the possibility of leakage.  If other countries do engage in their own 
climate regulation, then U.S. regulators need not fear leakage as much and can regulate carbon 
more strictly.  A given regulation may be cost-justified if China also acts but not if China fails to 
act.  Yet cost-benefit analysis does not permit for speculation about how other countries will 
behave.    Agencies such as the DOT and DOE are in no position to predict whether China will 
regulate carbon or not, and so cannot, consistent with the norms of cost-benefit analysis, use an 
SCC that assumes action on the part of the China. 
 
 Second, climate regulation by the United States might itself affect how other countries 
act.  There are two possibilities.  One is that if the United States moves first, it provides 
leadership that motivates other countries to engage in climate regulation.  The other is that if the 
United States moves first, other countries free ride and refuse to engage in climate regulation.  
Cost-benefit analysis cannot predict the likely diplomatic consequences of agency actions. 
 
 Third, U.S. climate regulation will affect the well-being of many more foreigners than 
Americans.  Yet there is no agreed-upon formula for evaluating the benefits of avoided harms for 
non-Americans living in other countries.  An agency might use American valuations; or it might 
defer to the valuations used in foreign countries; or it might exclude foreign costs and benefits.  
The right approach depends on normative questions that are prior to cost-benefit analysis, and 
institutional and political questions that cost-benefit analysis does not address. 
 
 Fourth, although a scientific consensus holds that anthropogenic climate change will 
cause significant harm to people around the world, there is no scientific consensus regarding how 
much of that harm will be experienced by Americans in the United States.  If cost-benefit 
properly takes into account only effects in the United States, then agencies should engage in only 
limited climate regulation. 
 
 The broader point is that cost-benefit analysis will be ineffective whenever a regulation 
raises principally normative and political questions, rather than technocratic ones.  This is why 
cost-benefit analysis is considered inapplicable to abortion and Establishment Clause questions, 
for instance.  Without some mechanism for evaluating the normative and political questions 
central to those subjects, cost-benefit analysis has little purchase. 
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We suspect that all of these difficulties have caused agencies to avoid relying on a single 
SCC in their regulatory impact statements, for fear that a court would find the cost-benefit 
analysis defective because the SCC figures are unsupported.  However, ignoring these problems 
does not solve them.  As we noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit struck down an earlier CAFE rule 
because DOT failed to take into account the SCC.142 
 
Yet if the IWG’s cost-benefit analysis is not suited to the task of pricing carbon, what 
should the government do?  In an ideal world, the United States and other countries would enter 
into a climate treaty that would establish the SCC.  Note that this SCC would be a political 
figure, reflecting a compromise that different nations reach for political purposes, rather than a 
figure determined using traditional economic methodology.  But the figure could be easily 
plugged into cost-benefit analyses used by agencies for regulation—at least, as long as agencies 
are given proper executive or congressional authorization to use a politically stipulated figure 
rather than the actual figure that emerges from climate models.  A climate treaty could also 
render agency regulation unnecessary by creating a cap-and-trade scheme.  Because people 
would have to pay for the harm they cause to the climate, they would fully internalize the 
climatic costs of their activity, and additional regulation administered by the regulatory agencies 
would be unnecessary.  Congress would need to pass a law that provides that the government 
must treat the treaty-based SCC as if it were the real social cost of carbon, to ensure that 
additional regulations beyond American treaty commitments are not issued. 
 
However, a climate treaty is still far off; what should U.S. regulatory agencies do in the 
meantime?  We believe that agencies conducting cost-benefit analysis cannot use the IWG’s 
SCC.  The SCC is highly arbitrary: it assumes that foreign harms should be treated identically to 
domestic harms; assumes that there will be zero leakage; and assumes away the possibility of a 
diplomatic solution.  Even the choice of which of the IWG’s four SCCs to use is arbitrary.  (It 
may well be for this reason that agencies are at such pains to argue that the choice of SCC will 
not affect the regulatory decision.)  As a matter of policy and law, cost-benefit analysis cannot 
use arbitrary valuations.143  It is possible that a case could be made for a much lower SCC, using 
lower bound estimates for American impacts that are scientifically supportable, or even for a 
higher SCC.  But we think that the more honest and plausible approach would be for Congress to 
stipulate an SCC that reflects its political judgments (for example, that a high SCC would 
encourage rather than discourage other countries to join a climate treaty).  If Congress will not 
act, then the Obama administration should suspend Executive Order 12,296 for regulations 
touching on climate change and order agencies to use a figure that will encourage other countries 
to enter a climate treaty (if in fact such a figure exists);144 and initiate notice-and-comment 
rulemaking as a second-best means of addressing the political questions that cost-benefit analysis 
cannot answer. 
 
                                                 
142 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d 1172. 
143 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (ordering courts to set aside agency action that is “arbitrary [or] capricious”). 
144 Whether such an order would be lawful would depend on the proper interpretation of the particular statutes 
involved, taking into account the conflicting pressures of the Chevron doctrine, which confers discretion on the 
executive to achieve policy objectives, and the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
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Conclusion 
 
 Contrary to popular perception, the U.S. government has already begun engaging in 
climate regulation.  Congressional paralysis on climate legislation has not stood in the way 
because U.S. regulatory agencies derive authority from their authorizing statutes and the cost-
benefit executive order, which requires them to take into account all the possible benefits of 
regulation. 
 
 That is the good news.  The bad news is that the agencies’ regulatory efforts have been 
inadequate.  Simultaneously miscalculating the SCC and ignoring their own numbers, agencies 
manage to do cost-benefit analysis poorly and then disregard it.  Much improvement can take 
place through purely technical adjustment, and the IWG has led the way.  Many of the problems 
that we have identified can be resolved through further research or reasonable guesswork.  But it 
is important to understand that although more precise domestic and global SCC figures can be 
useful information for political actors, they cannot be used in a conventional cost-benefit analysis 
performed at the agency level because serious political issues remain as a result of the global 
nature of climate change and the uncertainties that continue to surround it.  For this reason, the 
cost-benefit executive order does not provide a foundation for further agency regulation.  
Congressional or executive intervention is necessary. 
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